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Abstract
Differential privacy is the gold standard in data privacy, with applications in the
public and private sectors. While differential privacy is a formal mathematical
definition from the theoretical computer science literature, it is also understood by
statisticians and data experts thanks to its hypothesis testing interpretation. This
informally says that one cannot effectively test whether a specific individual has
contributed her data by observing the output of a private mechanism—any test
cannot have both high significance and high power.
In this paper, we show that recently proposed relaxations of differential privacy
based on Rényi divergence do not enjoy a similar interpretation. Specifically, we
introduce the notion of k-generatedness for an arbitrary divergence, where the
parameter k captures the hypothesis testing complexity of the divergence. We
show that the divergence used for differential privacy is 2-generated, and hence it
satisfies the hypothesis testing interpretation. In contrast, Rényi divergence is only
∞-generated, and hence has no hypothesis testing interpretation. We also show
sufficient conditions for general divergences to be k-generated.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [12] is a formal notion of data privacywhich enables accurate statistical analyses
on populations and preserves privacy of the individuals contributing their data. Differential privacy
is supported by a rich theory, which simplifies the design and formal analysis of private algorithms.
This theory has helped make differential privacy a de facto standard for privacy-preserving data
analysis. Over the last years, differential privacy has become in use in the private sector [19] by
companies such as Google [13, 25], Apple [29], and Uber [16], and in the public sector by agencies
such as the U.S. Census Bureau [2, 14]. A common challenge across all uses of differential privacy
face is to explain it to users and policy makers. Indeed, differential privacy first emerged in the the-
oretical computer science community, and only was only subsequently considered in other research
areas interested in data privacy. For this reason, several works have attempted to provide different
interpretations of the semantics of differential privacy in an effort to make it more accessible.
One approach that has been particularly successful, especially when introducing differential privacy
to people versed in statistical data analysis, is the hypothesis testing interpretation of differential
privacy [30, 17]. One can imagine an experiment where one wants to test through a differentially
private mechanism the null hypothesis that an individual I (for every possible I) has contributed
her data to a particular dataset x0. One can also imagine that an alternative hypothesis is that the
individual I has not contributed her data. Then, the definition of differential privacy guarantees—and
is in fact equivalent to requiring—that every hypothesis test that is designed for such experiment has
either high significance (it has a high rate of Type I errors), or low power (it has a high rate of Type
II errors). In fact, this interpretation goes even further because it also explain the privacy parameters
as quantities regulating this experiment and the level of acceptable significance and power.
Recently, several relaxations of differential privacy have been proposed [24, 4, 5, 9]. Most of these
new privacy definitions have been proposed as privacy notions with better composition properties
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than differential privacy. Having better composition can become a key advantage when a high num-
ber of data accesses is needed for a single analysis (e.g., in private deep learning [1]). Technically,
many these relaxations are formulated as bounds on the Rényi divergence between the distribution
obtained when running a private mechanism over a dataset where an individual I has contributed her
data versus the case when the private mechanism is run over the dataset where I’s data is removed.
In this work we show formally that the relaxations of differential privacy based on the Rényi diver-
gence do not support the same hypothesis testing interpretation as differential privacy. The main
technical reason for this is that the Rényi divergence has a finer granularity than the divergence
that defines standard differential privacy. To quantify this difference we introduce the notion of k-
generatedness for a divergence. Intuitively, this notion expresses the number of decisions that are
needed in a test to fully characterize the divergence. We show that the divergence that is tradition-
ally used for differential privacy is 2-generated, and this allows one to interpret differential privacy
according to the standard hypothesis testing interpretation. On the other hand, Rényi divergence is
not k-generated for any finite k, though we show that it is∞-generated (where by∞we mean that it
is infinitely, but countably generated). This says that to characterize these relaxations of differential
privacy through an experiment similar to the one used in the hypothesis testing interpretation, one
needs to have an infinite number of possible decisions available. This shows a semantics separation
between standard differential privacy and relaxations based on Rényi divergence.
In addition we also study a sufficient condition to guarantee that a divergence is k-generated: diver-
gences defined as a supremum of a quasi-convex function F over probabilities of k-partitions are
k-generated. This allows one to construct divergences supporting the hypothesis testing interpreta-
tion by requiring them to be defined through an F giving a 2-generated divergence. The condition
is also necessary for quasi-convex divergences, characterizing k-generation for all quasi-convex di-
vergences.
Summarizing, our contributions are:
(1) We introduce the notion of k-generatedness for divergences. This notion describes the complexity
of a divergence in terms of the number of possible decisions that are needed in a test to fully
characterize the divergence.
(2) We show that the divergence used to characterize differential privacy is 2-generated, supporting
the usual hypothesis testing interpretation of differential privacy
(3) We show that Rényi divergence is ∞-generated, ruling out an hypothesis testing interpretation
for privacy notions based on it.
(4) We give sufficient and necessary conditions for a quasi-convex divergence to be k-generated.
Related work. Several works have studied the semantics of formal notions of data privacy and
differential privacy [10, 30, 11, 20, 21, 15, 18]. The hypothesis testing interpretation of differential
privacy was first introduced by Wasserman and Zhou [30] and then used in a formal way to study
the optimal composition theorem for differential privacy [17]. Several works [24, 4, 5, 9] have used
divergences to reason about privacy leakages. As discussed in the introduction, several of these
works are based on Rényi divergence [24, 4, 5]. Dong et al. [9] proposes to define new notions of
privacy based on the hypothesis testing interpretation; our work suggests lends support to this direc-
tion, showing that other existing variants of privacy do not enjoy a hypothesis testing interpretation.
The hypothesis testing interpretation of differential privacy has also inspired techniques in formal
verification [27, 28], including techniques to detect violations in differentially private implementa-
tions [8].
2 Background: hypothesis testing, privacy, and Rényi divergences
2.1 Hypothesis testing interpretation for (ε, δ)-differential privacy
We view randomized algorithms as functionsM : X → Prob(Y ) from a set X of inputs to the set
Prob(Y ) of discrete probability distributions over a set Y of outputs. We assume thatX is equipped
with a symmetric adjacency relation—informally, inputs are datasets and two inputs x0 and x1 are
adjacent iff they differ in the data of a single individual.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (DP) [12]). Let ε > 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. A randomized algorithm
M : X → Prob(Y ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every pairs of adjacent inputs x0 and x1,
2
and every subset S ⊆ Y , we have:
Pr[M(x0) ∈ S] ≤ e
εPr[M(x1) ∈ S] + δ.
Wasserman and Zhou [30], Kairouz et al. [17] proposed a useful interpretation of this guarantee
in terms of hypothesis testing. Suppose that x0 and x1 are adjacent inputs. The observer sees the
output y of running a private mechanismM on one of these inputs—but does not see the particular
input—and wants to guess whether the input was x0 or x1.
In the terminology of statistical hypothesis testing, let y ∈ Y be an output of a randomized mecha-
nismM, and take the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 : y came fromM(x0), H1 : y came fromM(x1)
One simple way of deciding between the two hypotheses is to fix a rejection region S ⊆ Y ; if the
observation y is in S then the null hypothesis is rejected, and if the observation y is not in S then the
null hypothesis is not rejected. These decision rules are known as deterministic decision rules.
Each decision rule can err in two possible ways. A false alarm (i.e. Type I error) is when the null
hypothesis is true but rejected. This error rate is defined as PFA(x0, x1,M, S)
def
= Pr[M(x0) ∈
S]. On the other hand, the decision rule may incorrectly fail to reject the null hypothesis, a false
negative (i.e. Type II error). The probability of missed detection is defined as PMD(x0, x1,M, S)
def
=
Pr[M(x1) /∈ S]. There is a natural tradeoff between these two errors—a rule with a larger rejection
region will be less likely to incorrectly fail to reject but more likely to incorrectly reject, while a rule
with a smaller rejection region will be less likely to incorrectly reject but more likely to incorrectly
fail to reject.
Differential privacy can now be reformulated in terms of these error rates.
Theorem 2 (Wasserman and Zhou [30], Kairouz et al. [17]). A randomized algorithmM : X →
Prob(Y ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every pair of adjacent inputs x0 and x1,
and any rejection region S ⊆ Y , we have: PFA(x0, x1,M, S) + e
εPMD(x0, x1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ and
eεPFA(x0, x1,M, S) + PMD(x0, x1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ.
Intuitively, the lower bound on the sum of the two error rates means that no decision rule is capable
of achieving low Type I error and low Type II error simultaneously. Thus, the output distributions
from any two adjacent inputs are statistically hard to distinguish.
Following Kairouz et al. [17], we can also reformulate the definition of differential privacy in terms
of a privacy region describing the attainable pairs of Type I and Type II errors.
Theorem 3 (Kairouz et al. [17]). A randomized algorithm M : X → Prob(Y ) is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if and only if for every pair of adjacent inputs x0 and x1,
(PFA(x0, x1,M, S), PMD(x0, x1,M, S)) ∈ R(ε, δ)
where the privacy region R(ε, δ) is defined as:
R(ε, δ) = {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]|(1− α) ≤ eεβ + δ}
Since the original introduction of differential privacy, researchers have proposed several other vari-
ants based on Rényi divergence. The central question of this paper is: can we give similar hypothesis
testing interpretations to these (and other) variants of differential privacy?
2.2 Relaxations of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence
We recall here notions of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence.
Definition 4 (Rényi divergence [26]). Let α > 1. The Rényi divergence of order α between two
probability distributions µ1 and µ2 on a spaceX is defined by:
DαX(µ1||µ2)
def
=
1
α− 1
log
∑
x∈X
µ2(x)
(
µ1(x)
µ2(x)
)α
. (1)
3
The above definition does not consider the cases α = 1 and α = +∞. However we can see the
divergence as a function of α for fixed distributions and consider the limit. We have:
D1X(µ1||µ2)
def
= KLX(µ1||µ2) D
∞
X (µ1||µ2)
def
= log sup
x
µ1(x)
µ2(x)
The first limit is the well-known KL divergence, while the second limit is the max divergence that
bounds the pointwise ratio of probabilities; standard (ε, 0)-differential privacy bounds this diver-
gence on distributions from adjacent inputs.
There are several notions of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence, differing in whether the
bound holds for all orders α or just some orders. The first notion we consider is Rényi Differential
Privacy (RDP) [24].
Definition 5 (Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) [24]). Let α ∈ [1,∞). A randomized algorithm
M : X → Prob(Y ) is (α, ρ)-Rényi differentially private if for every pair x0 and x1 of adjacent
inputs, we have
DαX(M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ ρ.
Renyi Differential privacy considers a fixed value of α. In contrast, zero-Concentrated Differential
Privacy (zCDP) [4] quantifies over all possible α > 1.
Definition 6 (zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) [4]). A randomized algorithm M :
X → Prob(Y ) is (ξ, ρ)-zero concentrated differentially private if for every pairs of adjacent inputs
x0 and x1, we have
∀α > 1. DαY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ ξ + αρ. (2)
Truncated Concentrated Differential Privacy (tCDP) [5] quantifies over all α below a given thresh-
old.
Definition 7 (Truncated Concentrated Differential Privacy (tCDP) [5]). A randomized algorithm
M : X → Prob(Y ) is (ρ, ω)-truncated concentrated differentially private if for every pairs of
adjacent inputs x0 and x1, we have
∀1 < α < ω. DαY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ αρ. (3)
These notions are all motivated by bounds on the privacy loss of a randomized algorithm. This
quantity is defined by
Lx0→x1(y) =
Pr[M(x0) = y]
Pr[M(x1) = y]
,
where x0 and x1 are two adjacent inputs. Intuitively, the privacy loss measures how much informa-
tion is revealed by an output y. While output values with a large privacy loss are highly revealing—
they are far more likely to result from a private input x0 rather than a different private input x1—if
these outputs are only seen with small probability then it may be reasonable to discount their in-
fluence. The different privacy definitions bound different moments this privacy loss, treated as a
random variable when y is drawn from the output of the algorithm on input x0. The following table
summarizes these bounds.
Privacy Bound on privacy loss L
(ε, δ)-DP Pry∼M(x0)[L
x0→x1(y) ≤ eε] ≥ 1− δ
(α, ρ)-RDP Ey∼M(x1)[L
x0→x1(y)α] ≤ e(α−1)ρ
(ξ, ρ)-zCDP ∀α ∈ (1,∞). Ey∼M(x1)[L
x0→x1(y)α] ≤ e(α−1)(ξ+αρ)
(ω, ρ)-tCDP ∀α ∈ (1, ω). Ey∼M(x1)[L
x0→x1(y)α] ≤ e(α−1)αρ
In particular, DP bounds the maximum value of the privacy loss,1 (α, ·)-RDP bounds the α-moment,
zCDP bounds all moments, and (·, ω)-tCDP bounds the moments up to some cutoff ω. Many con-
versions are known between these definitions; for instance, the relaxations of RDP, zCDP, and tCDP
are known to sit between (ε, 0) and (ε, δ)-differential privacy in terms of expressivity, up to some
modification in the parameters. While this means that RDP, zCDP, and tCDP can sometimes be ana-
lyzed by reduction to standard differential privacy, converting between the different notions requires
weakening the parameters and often the privacy analysis is simpler or more precise when working
with RDP, zCDP, or tCDP directly. The interested reader can refer to the original papers [4, 24, 5].
1Technically speaking, this is true only for sufficiently well-behaved distributions [23].
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3 k-generated divergences
In this section we establish that RDP, zCDP and tCDP cannot be described in terms of hypothesis
testing. Our main technical tool is the new notion of k-generatedness. We first formulate this notion
for general divergences, then consider specific divergences from differential privacy.
3.1 Background and notation
We use standard notation and terminology from discrete probability. We let [0, 1] and [0,∞] stand
for the unit interval {r | 0 ≤ r ≤ 1} and the positive extended real line {r | 0 ≤ r} ∪ {+∞}
respectively. We let Prob(X) denote the set of probability distributions over a set X . When X
is a finite set with k elements, i.e. |X | = k, we sometimes treat Prob(X) as a subset of [0, 1]k.
Moreover, for every x ∈ X , the Dirac distribution dx centered at x is defined by dx(x′) = 1 if
x = x′ and dx(x′) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, we define the convex combination
∑n
i=1 ai · µi of
µ1, µ2, . . . , µn ∈ Prob(X) to be (
∑n
i=1 ai · µi)(x) =
∑n
i=1(ai · µi(x)). It is easy to check that∑n
i=1 ai · µi ∈ Prob(X) for every a1 . . . an ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑n
i=1 ai = 1,
For any probability distribution µ ∈ Prob(X) and γ : X → Prob(Y ), we define µ♯(γ) ∈ Prob(Y )
to be (µ♯(γ))(y) =
∑
x∈X(γ(x))(y) · µ(x) for every y ∈ Y . For any probability distribution
µ ∈ Prob(X) and a function γ : X → Y (called a deterministic decision rule), we define µ(γ) ∈
Prob(Y ) to be (µ(γ))(y) =
∑
x∈γ−1(y) µ(x) for every y ∈ Y . We have µ
♯(y 7→ dy ◦ γ) = µ(γ).
3.2 Divergences between probability distributions
We start from a very general definition of divergences. Our notation includes the domain of def-
inition of the divergence; this distinction will be important when introducing the concept of k-
generatedness.
Definition 8. A divergence is a family∆ = {∆X} of functions
∆X : Prob(X)× Prob(X)→ [0,∞].
We use the notation∆X(µ1||µ2) to denote the “distance” between distributions µ1 and µ2.
Our notion of divergence subsumes the general notion of f -divergence from the literature [6, 7].
Moreover, (ε, δ)-differential privacy can be reformulated using the ε-divergence [3] defined as fol-
lows:
∆εX(µ1||µ2) = sup
S⊆X
(Pr[µ1 ∈ S]− e
εPr[µ2 ∈ S]).
Specifically, a randomized algorithmM : X → Prob(Y ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only
if for every pair of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, we have
∆εY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ δ.
Many useful properties of divergences have been explored in the literature. Our technical develop-
ment will involve the following two properties.
• (post-processing inequality) A divergence∆ satisfies the post-processing inequalityiff for
every γ : X → Prob(Y ),∆Y (µ
♯
1(γ)||µ
♯
2(γ)) ≤ ∆X(µ1||µ2).
• (quasi-convexity) A divergence ∆ is quasi-convex iff for every α1, . . . , αm ∈ [0, 1] such
that
∑N
m=1αm = 1 and every discrete set X ,
∆X(
∑N
m=1αmµ1,m||
∑N
m=1αmµ2,m) ≤ maxm
∆X(µ1,m||µ2,m)
These light restrictions are satisfied by many common divergences. Besides Rényi divergences, they
also hold for all f -divergences [6, 7].
3.3 k-generatedness: definitions and basic properties
We now introduce the notion of k-generatedness. Informally, k-generatedness is a measure of the
number of decisions that are needed in an hypothesis test to characterize a divergence.
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Definition 9. Let k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. A divergence ∆ is k-generated if there exists a set Y such that
|Y | = k and for every discrete set X and µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X),
∆X(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob(Y )
∆Y (γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2))
We say that∆ is deterministically k-generated if there exists a set Y such that |Y | = k and for every
discrete set X and µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X),
∆X(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→Y
∆Y (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2))
Lemma 10. The following basic properties hold for all k-generated divergences.
• If ∆ is 1-generated, then ∆ is constant, i.e. for every discrete set X there exists cx such
that for every µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X), we have∆X(µ1||µ2) = cX .
• If∆ is (deterministically) k-generated, then it is also (deterministically) k + 1-generated.
• If ∆ is deterministically k-generated and satisfies the post-processing inequality, then it is
also k-generated.
• If∆ satisfies the post-processing inequality, then it is also∞-generated.
The following lemma shows that every k-generated divergence is also deterministically k-generated,
so long as it is quasi-convex.
Theorem 11. Any k-generated quasi-convex divergence∆ is also deterministically k-generated.
To prove the equivalence we use a weak version of Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, which states
that every probabilistic decision rule can be decomposed into a convex combination of deterministic
ones.
Theorem 12 (Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann). Let k, l ∈ N and k > l. Let X and Y such that
|X | = k and |Y | = l. Then for every γ : X → Prob(Y ), there exist N ∈ N, γ1, . . . , γN : X → Y
and a1, . . . , aN ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑N
m=1 am = 1 and γ(x) =
∑N
m=1 amdγm(x) for any x ∈ X .
3.4 2-generatedness and hypothesis testing
In general, k-generated divergences have a close connection to the number k of decisions that are
needed in an hypothesis test to fully characterize the divergence. For instance, a divergence that is 2-
generated has a straightforward interpretation in terms of traditional hypothesis testing interpretation
under probabilistic decision rules. For any 2-generated divergence ∆, we can define an analogous
privacy region for hypothesis testing:
R∆(δ) = {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] | ∆2(αd0 + (1− α)d1‖(1− β)d0 + βd1) ≤ δ}
From the isomorphism Prob({accept, reject}) ∼= [0, 1], the following equivalence follows from
definitions.
Lemma 13. A divergence∆ is 2-generated if and only if the following condition holds:
∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ
⇐⇒ ∀γ : X → Prob({accept, reject}).((γ♯(µ1))(accept), (γ
♯(µ2))(reject)) ∈ R
∆(δ).
Here, every function γ of type X → Prob({accept, reject}) can be seen as a (probabilistic) de-
cision rule, determining the acceptance or rejection of a null hypothesis. Therefore, the probabilities
(γ♯(µ1))(accept) and (γ♯(µ2))(reject) can be seen as the Type I error and Type II error of the
corresponding test.
Hence, the above lemma says that ∆ is 2-generated if and only if we can bound, accordingly to
the region R∆(δ), the Type I error and Type II errors of every test. Moreover, if a divergence is
quasi-convex, this is equivalent to hypothesis testing under the more common deterministic decision
rules. Thus, for quasi-convex and 2-generated ∆, we have the condition (Pr[µ1 ∈ S],Pr[µ2 /∈
S]) ∈ R∆(δ) on Type I error and Type II errors under every rejection region S ⊆ X whenever
∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ.
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4 Applications to differential privacy
4.1 (ε, δ)-differential privacy is 2-generated
In our framework, the hypothesis testing interpretation of (ε, δ)-differential privacy follows from the
fact that ε-divergence is 2-generated.
Theorem 14. The ε-divergence∆ε is 2-generated for all ε.
By Lemma 13 and Theorems 11 and 14, we can re-prove that the notion of differential privacy
can be characterized by hypothesis testing with both deterministic and probabilistic decision rules
respectively.
It is worth noticing that the result above says that the ε-divergence can be fully characterized in terms
of traditional hypothesis tests, i.e. in terms of binary decision rules and the ε-divergence over the
space Prob({accept, reject}). This means that we do not lose anything in looking at differential
privacy through the lenses of the hypothesis testing interpretation. This is not the case for other
privacy definitions based on Rényi divergence, as we will show in the next section.
4.2 Other examples
Along similar lines to what we showed for the ε-divergence, one can show that the total variation
distance2 is also is 2-generated.
Recently, Dong et al. [9] proposed a formal definition of data privacy based on the notion of trade-
off function and satisfying the hypothesis testing interpretation, similarly to differential privacy. We
can characterize the trade-off functions between Type I errors and Type II errors they use by the
following family {∆TO(α)}0≤α≤1 of divergences
∆TO(α)(µ1||µ2) = sup
{
γ♯(µ2)(accept)
∣∣∣∣ γ♯(µ1)(reject) ≤ α,γ : X → Prob({accept, reject})
}
.
By using T (µ1, µ2)(α) = 1−∆TO(α)(µ1||µ2) we obtain the actual trade-off function. It is easy to
show that this family of divergences is also 2-generated.
4.3 Rényi divergence is∞-generated
Rényi divergence is not 2-generated. To see this letX = a, b, c and let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X) be defined
by µ1(a) = µ1(b) = µ1(c) = 13 and µ2(a) =
p2
p2+p+1 , µ2(b) =
p
p2+p+1 and µ2(b) =
1
p2+p+1 . Let
Y = {accept, reject}. Then a simple calculation shows:
sup
γ:X→Prob(Y )
DαY (γ
#(µ1)||γ
#(µ2)) < D
α
X(µ1||µ2)
Similar results can be shown for the divergences used for zCDP and tCDP for specific values of the
privacy parameters (see the appendix).
In general, Rényi divergences is exactly∞-generated. First, it is not k-generated for any finite k.
Theorem 15. For any α > 1, the α-Rényi divergence is not k-generated for any finite k ∈ N.
By Lemma 10, we conclude that α-Rényi divergence is exactly∞-generated. Moreover, thanks to
the continuity of Rényi divergence [22], we can generalize this result to uncountable domains and
general probability measures.
On the hypothesis testing interpretation of Rényi divergence The results above imply that we
cannot have an analogous of Lemma 13 for Rényi divergence. Specifically, we cannot fully character-
ize the Rényi divergence between two distributions in terms of hypothesis tests—or more precisely,
in terms of binary decision rules and Rényi divergence over the set Prob({accept, reject}).
LetX be an infinite set. For every finite set Y , we have for some µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X),
DαX(µ1||µ2) > sup
γ : X→Prob(Y )
DαY (γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)).
2Given by∆TV(µ1||µ2) = supS⊆X(Pr[µ1 ∈ S] + Pr[µ2 /∈ S]).
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but this inequality is strict, so if we consider only a decision rules with a finite number of decisions,
we do not fully capture the Rényi divergence between two distributions.
In fact, every divergence ∆ can be approximated by a k-generated version ∆k by picking a set Y
such that |Y | = k and setting:
∆k(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob(Y )
∆Y (γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)).
One example of this phenomenon is the 2-generated versionKl2 of the Kullback-Leibler divergence
KL. This is a well studied divergence often referred to as the binary relative entropy. We can take
a similar approach for the Rényi divergence of an arbitrary order α, and study these restrictions.
However, it is not clear whether these divergences would give good properties for privacy.
If instead one wants to focus just on the traditional version of Rényi divergence, the∞-generatedness
tells us that to fully characterize it through an experiment, we need to have an infinite number of
possible decisions available.
5 A characterization of k-generated divergences
As we have seen, k-generated divergences satisfy a number of useful properties; known divergences
from the literature can be classified according to this parameter k. In the other direction, we give a
simple condition to ensure that a divergence is k-generated: suprema of quasi-convex functions over
size k-partitions determine k-generated divergences.
Theorem 16. Let X be a countable domain, and let F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞] be a quasi-convex
function and define the following divergence:
∆X(µ1, µ2) = sup{F (µ1(A1), · · · , µ1(Ak), µ2(A1), · · · , µ2(Ak)) | {Ai}
k
i=1 : partition of X}
Then the divergence∆X is k-generated.
We sketch the proof for discrete probability distributions; it also holds for general measures.
Proof. The direction ≤ is not hard to show: any partition {Ai}ki=1 defines a map X → [k] from
each point to its partition, which is a deterministic decision ruleX → Prob([k]).
For the reverse direction ≥, given a decision rule γ : X → Prob([k]) we can apply Theorem 12
to decompose γ as a convex combination γ =
∑
i∈I λi · fi, where each fi : X → Prob([k])
corresponds to a deterministic decision rule fi : X → [k]. By quasi-convexity of F , we have:
F ((γ♯(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ1))(Ak), (γ
♯(µ2))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ2))(Ak))
= F
(∑
i∈I
λi · ((fi(µ1))(A1), · · · , (fi(µ1))(Ak), (fi(µ2))(A1), · · · , (fi(µ2))(Ak))
)
≤ sup
i∈I
F ((fi(µ1))(A1), · · · , (fi(µ1))(Ak), (fi(µ2))(A1), · · · , (fi(µ2))(Ak))
≤ ∆X(µ1, µ2).
As a converse to Theorem 11, this result characterizes k-generated quasi-convex divergences. It
also serves as a useful tool to construct new divergences with a hypothesis testing interpretation, by
varying the quasi-convex function F .
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that recent relaxations of differential privacy defined in terms of Rényi
divergence do not have a hypothesis testing interpretation similar to the one for standard differential
privacy. We introduced the notion of k-generatedness for a divergence, which quantifies the number
of decisions that are needed in an experiment similar to the ones used in hypothesis testing to fully
characterize the divergence. This notion is also a measure of the complexity that tools for formal
verification may have. We leave the study of this connection for future work.
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We sometimes regard k ∈ N as a k point set {1, 2, . . . , k}. In particular, 2 is used for a two point set
{accept, reject} in this paper3.
A Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem
Theorem 17 (Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem). Let k, l ∈ N and k > l. For any γ : k →
Prob(l), there are γ1, γ2, . . . , γN : k → l and 0 ≤ a1, a2, . . . , aN ≤ 1 such that
∑N
m=1 am = 1
and γ(i) =
∑N
m=1 amdγm(i) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The cardinal k can be relaxed to countable infinite cardinal ω, and then the families {γj}j and {aj}j
may be infinite.
Proof. Consider the following matrix representation f of γ:
f =


f1,1 · · · fl,1
...
...
f1,k · · · fl,k

 .
where fi,j = γ(i)(j) and
∑N
j=1 fi,j = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
For any h : k → l, the matrix representation g of ({x 7→ dx} ◦ h) is
g =


g1,1 · · · gl,1
...
...
g1,k · · · gl,k


satisfying that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, there is exactly 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that gi,j = 1 and gi,s = 0 for
s 6= j. Conversely, any matrix g satisfying this condition corresponds to some function h : k → l.
Consider the family G of matrix representations of maps of the form ({x 7→ dx} ◦ h). We give an
algorithm decomposing f to a convex sum of g:
1. Let r0 = 1 and f˜0 = f . We have
∑
j(f˜0)i,j = r0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
2. For given 0 ≤ rm ≤ 1 and f˜m satisfying
∑
j(f˜m)i,j = rm for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we define
gm+1 ∈ G, αm+1 ∈ [0, 1], f˜m+1 and rm+1 ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
αm+1 = min
s
max
t
(f˜m)s,t, rm+1 = rm − αm+1,
(gm+1)i,j =
{
1 j = argmax
s
(f˜m)i,s
0 (otherwise)
, f˜m+1 = f˜m − αm+1 · gm+1.
3. If rs+1 = 0 then we terminate. Otherwise, we repeat the previous step.
In each step, we obtain the following conditions:
• We have gm+1 ∈ G because gm+1 can be written as gm+1 = {x 7→ dx} ◦
(λi. argmax
s
(f˜m)i,s).
• We have 0 < αm+1 whenever 0 < rm because
αm+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃i. max
j
(f˜m)i,j = 0 =⇒ ∃i. rm =
∑
j
(f˜m)i,j = 0.
3For simplicity, we use here the term accept but as usual in hypothesis testing this should be interpreted as
“fail to reject”.
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• We have 0 ≤ (f˜m+1)i,j ≤ 1 for any (i, j) from the following equation:
(f˜m+1)i,j =
{
(f˜m)i,j −mintmaxs(f˜m)t,s if j = argmax
s
(f˜m)i,s
(f˜m)i,j otherwise .
When i = argmin
s
maxt(f˜m)s,t and j = argmax
s
(f˜m)i,s, we obtain (f˜m+1)i,j = 0 while
0 < (f˜m+1)i,j . This implies that the number of 0 in f˜m increases in this operation.
• We also have
∑
j(f˜m+1)i,j = rm+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k because∑
j
(f˜m+1)i,j =
∑
j
(f˜m)i,j − αm+1 ·
∑
j
(g˜m+1)i,j = rm − αm+1 · 1 = rm+1.
Therefore the construction of gl ∈ G, αl ∈ [0, 1], f˜l and rl ∈ [0, 1] terminates within k·l steps. When
the construction terminates at the step N (rN = 0 also holds), we have a convex decomposition of
f by f =
∑N
m=1 αm · gm where
∑N
m=1 αm = 1. This implies By taking γ1, γ2, . . . , γN : k → l
such that gm is a matrix representation of ({x 7→ dx} ◦ γm), we obtain γ(i) =
∑N
m=1 amdγm(i) for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ k with 0 ≤ a1, a2, . . . , aN ≤ 1 and
∑N
m=1 am = 1.
B Generalizing quasi-convex characterization of k-generation
Recall that Theorem 16 shows that suprema of quasi-convex functions over k-partitions of a count-
able domain are k-generated quasi-convex divergences. This section generalizes this result to prob-
ability measures over general measurable spaces.
Theorem 18 (k-generatedness in measurable setting). Assume that F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞] is quasi-
convex and continuous. For any measurable spaceX , we have
∆X(µ1, µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob(k)
∆X(γ
♯(µ1), γ
♯(µ2)).
Proof. We easily calculate as follows (functions are assumed to be measurable):
∆X(µ1, µ2)
= sup{F (µ1(A1), · · · , µ1(Ak), µ2(A1), · · · , µ2(Ak)) | {Ai}
k
i=1 : m’ble partition ofX}
= sup{F (µ1(f
−1(1)), · · · , µ1(f
−1(k)), µ2(f
−1(1)), · · · , µ1(f
−1(k))) | f : X → k}
= sup{F ((f(µ1))(1), · · · , (f(µ1))(k), (f(µ2))(1), · · · , (f(µ2))(k)) | f : X → k}
≤ sup{F ((γ♯(µ1))(1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ1))(k), (γ
♯(µ2))(1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ2))(k)) | γ : X → Prob(k)}
≤ sup
{
F
(
(γ♯(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ1))(Ak),
(γ♯(µ2))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ2))(Ak)
) ∣∣ γ : X → Prob(k),
{Ai}
k
i=1 : m’ble partition ofX
}
= sup
γ : X→Prob(k)
∆k(γ
♯(µ1), γ
♯(µ2))
Note that we treat k as a finite discrete space. Consider the family {Jn}∞n=1 of finite sets (discrete
spaces) defined as follows:
Jn = {(j1, . . . , jk) | j1, . . . , jk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2
n − 1}, Cnj1...jk 6= ∅}.
We fix a measurable function γ : X → Prob(k) and treat Prob(k) as a subset of [0, 1]k. For each
n ∈ N, we define a measurable partition {Cnj1...jk}j1,...,jk∈{0,1,...,2n−1} ofX by
Cnj1...jk = γ
−1(Bnj1...jk)
where Bnj1...jN = Dj1 × · · · ×Djk ((j1 . . . jk) ∈ Jn),
Dn0 = {0} andD
n
l+1 = (l/2
n, (l + 1)/2n] (l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1).
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We next define m∗n : X → Jn and mn : Jn → X as follows: m
∗
n(x) is the unique element
(j1, . . . , jk) ∈ Jn satisfying x ∈ Cnj1,...,jk , and we choosemn(j1, . . . , jk) is an element of C
n
j1,...,jk
.
Thanks to the measurability of each Cnj1...jk , the functionm
∗
n is measurable, and the measurability
ofmn follows from the discreteness of Jn. From the construction of {Cnj1...jk}j1,...,jk∈{0,1,...,2n−1},
for any n ∈ N, x ∈ X , and i ∈ I , we have,
|γ(x)(i) − (γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)(x)(i)| ≤ 1/2
n
This implies that the sequence {γ ◦mn ◦m∗n}
∞
n=1 of measurable function converges uniformly to γ.
Hence, for any n ∈ N andD ⊆ k, we have∣∣∣∣
∫
γ(x)(D) dµ1(x) −
∫
(γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)(x)(D) dµ1(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2n
Hence the sequence of probability measures {(γ ◦mn ◦m∗n)
♯(µ1)}
∞
n=1 converges to the probability
measure γ♯(µ1). Similarly, {(γ ◦mn ◦m∗n)
♯(µ2)}∞n=1 converges to γ
♯(µ2).
By the continuity of F , we obtain
F ((γ♯(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ1))(Ak), (γ
♯(µ2))(A1), · · · , (γ
♯(µ2))(Ak))
= lim
n→∞
F
(
((γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)
♯(µ1))(A1), · · · , ((γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)
♯(µ1))(Ak),
((γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)
♯(µ2))(A1), · · · , ((γ ◦mn ◦m
∗
n)
♯(µ2))(Ak)
)
= lim
n→∞
F
(
((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ1)))(A1), · · · , ((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ1)))(Ak),
((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ2)))(A1), · · · , ((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ2)))(Ak)
)
≤ sup
n∈N
∆k(((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ1))), ((γ ◦mn)
♯(m∗n(µ2))))
{Since∆Jn is finite (countable and discrete), we can apply Theorem 16.}
≤ sup
n∈N
∆Jn(m
∗
n(µ1),m
∗
n(µ2))
= sup
n∈N
sup{F ((f(m∗n(µ1)))(1), · · · , (f(m
∗
n(µ1)))(k), (f(m
∗
n(µ2)))(1), · · · , ((f(m
∗
n(µ1)))(k)) | f : Jn → k}
≤ sup{F ((g(µ1))(1), · · · , (g(µ1))(k), (g(µ2))(1), · · · , (g(µ2))(k)) | g : X → k}
= ∆X(µ1, µ2).
This implies supγ : X→Prob(k)∆k(γ
♯(µ1), γ
♯(µ2)) ≤ ∆X(µ1, µ2).
C Omitted Proofs
Theorem 19 (Lemma 13). A divergence ∆ is 2-generated if and only if the following condition
holds:
∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ
⇐⇒ ∀γ : X → Prob({accept, reject}).((γ♯(µ1))(accept), (γ
♯(µ2))(reject)) ∈ R
∆(δ).
Proof. We remark, for all γ : X → Prob({accept, reject}) and 0 ≤ δ,
((γ♯(µ1))(accept), (γ
♯(µ2))(reject)) ∈ R
∆(δ) ⇐⇒ ∆2(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)) ≤ δ.
( =⇒ ) From the 2-generatedness of∆, we have
∆X(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob({accept,reject})
∆2(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)).
This implies that for any 0 ≤ δ, we have
∀γ : X → Prob({accept, reject}).((γ♯(µ1))(accept), (γ
♯(µ2))(reject)) ∈ R
∆(δ)
⇐⇒ ∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ.
(⇐= ) From the assumption, for any 0 ≤ δ, we have
∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ ⇐⇒ sup
γ : X→Prob({accept,reject})
∆2(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)) ≤ δ
This implies∆X(µ1||µ2) = supγ : X→Prob({accept,reject})∆2(γ
♯(µ1)||γ♯(µ2)) ≤ δ.
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Theorem 20 (Theorem 11). Consider a k-generated divergence∆. If the divergence is also quasi-
convex
∆X(
∑N
m=1αmµ1,m||
∑N
m=1αmµ2,m) ≤ maxm
∆X(µ1,m||µ2,m) where
∑N
m=1αm = 1
then we also have the following characterization using deterministic decision rule:
∀X, ∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).∆X(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→k
∆k(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)).
Proof. By the k-generatedness of∆, we obviously have
sup
γ : X→k
∆k(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ sup
γ : X→Prob(k)
∆k(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)) = ∆X(µ1||µ2).
We fix γ : X → Prob(k). By weak Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, it can be decomposed into
a convex combination γ =
∑N
m=1 amdγm of deterministic decision rules γ1, γ2, . . . , γN : k → l,
where 0 ≤ a1, a2, . . . , aN ≤ 1 and
∑N
m=1 am = 1.
By quasi-convexity of∆, we obtain
∆k(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)) = ∆k(
∑N
m=1amγm(µ1)||
∑N
m=1amγm(µ2))
≤ sup
γ : X→k
∆k(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)).
This implies
∆X(µ1||µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob(k)
∆k(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2)) = sup
γ : X→k
∆k(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)).
Theorem 21 (Theorem 14). The ε-divergence∆ε is 2-generated for all ε.
Proof. For all X and probability measures µ1 and µ2, we calculate:
∆εX(µ1||µ2) = sup
S⊆X
(Pr[µ1 ∈ S]− e
εPr[µ2 ∈ S])
= sup
S⊆X
∆ε2(Pr[µ1 ∈ S]d0 + Pr[µ1 /∈ S]d1||Pr[µ2 ∈ S]d0 + Pr[µ2 /∈ S]d1)
= sup
γ : X→2
∆ε2(γ(µ1)||γ(µ1)) ≤ sup
γ : X→Prob(2)
∆ε2(γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ1)) ≤ ∆
ε
X(µ1||µ2).
Here the equalities and the first inequality are obtained by definitions. The last inequality is proved
from the post-processing inequality of ε-divergence∆ε. By anti-symmetry of inequality, all compo-
nents are equal. Thus, we obtain the 2-generatedness of∆ε.
Theorem 22. There are µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(3) such that
sup
γ:3→Prob(2)
Dα2 (γ
#(µ1)||γ
#(µ2)) < D
α
3 (µ1||µ2)
Proof. Consider the following two distributions over 3 = {0, 1, 2} with p = (1/2)β/(α−1) and
α+ 1 < β:
µ1 =
1
3
d0 +
1
3
d1 +
1
3
d2, µ2 =
p2
p2 + p+ 1
d0 +
p
p2 + p+ 1
d1 +
1
p2 + p+ 1
d2
We show that the inequalityDα2 (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) < D
α
3 (µ1||µ2) holds for any deterministic decision
rule γ : 3 → 2. There are 8 cases of γ : 3 → 2, but thanks to the post-processing inequality and
reflexivity of Rényi divergence, it suffices to discuss 3 cases. We obtain,
exp((α− 1)Dα3 (µ1||µ2))
exp((α− 1)Dα2 (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2))
≥ min
(
p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1
2α(p2 + p)1−α + 1
,
p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1
2α(p2 + 1)1−α + p1−α
,
p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1
2α(p+ 1)1−α + p2(1−α)
)
≥ min
(
2β + 2−β + 1
2α(p+ 1)1−α + 2−β
,
2β + 2−β + 1
2α−β(p2 + 1)1−α + 1
,
2β + 2−β + 1
2β + 2α−β(p+ 1)1−α
)
≥ min
(
2β + 2−β + 1
2α+1
,
2β + 2−β + 1
2β + 1
)
> 1.
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Hence, Dα2 (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) < D
α
3 (µ1||µ2) holds for any γ : 3 → 2. By the joint con-
vexity of the divergence exp((α − 1)Dα), we have supγ:3→Prob(2)D
α
2 (γ
#(µ1)||γ
#(µ2)) =
maxγ:3→2D
α
2 (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)). This completes the proof.
Theorem 23 (Theorem 15). Rényi divergence is not k-generated for any k ∈ N.
Proof. We may assume k > 1 because Rényi divergence is not constant. It suffices to show that the
divergence Γα = exp((α − 1)Dα) (it is the f -divergence for the weight function t 7→ tα) is not
k-generated.
Γα(µ1||µ2) =
∑
x∈X
(
µ1(x)
µ1(x)
)α
µ1(x) for µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).
Consider a pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(k+1) satisfying supp(µ1) = supp(µ2) = k+1 and µ1(i)/µ2(i) 6=
µ1(j)/µ2(j) where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k+1 and i 6= j. We can give such distributions in similar way as the
previous theorem. We have
sup
γ : k+1→Prob(k)
Γα(γ
♯µ1, γ
♯µ2)
{Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem and the joint convexity of Γα}
= max
γ : k+1→k
Γα(γ(µ1), γ(µ2)) = max
γ : k+1→k
k∑
j=1
(∑
γ(i)=j µ1(i)∑
γ(i)=j µ2(i)
)α
(
∑
γ(i)=j µ2(i))
{Jensen’s inequality and the strict convexity of the function t 7→ tα}
<
k+1∑
i=1
(
µ1(i)
µ2(i)
)α
µ2(i) = Γα(µ1, µ2).
Since k+1 > k, by Dirichlet’s pigeonhole principle, for any γ : k+1→ k, for some j, there are at
least two i1 and i2 such that γ(i1) = j and γ(i2) = j. From the assumption on µ1 and µ2, we have
(µ1(i1)/µ2(i1))
α 6= (µ1(i2)/µ2(i2))α Since the function t 7→ tα is strictly convex, by the condition
for equality of Jensen’s inequality, we have the strict inequality
(
µ1(i1) + µ1(i2)
µ2(i1) + µ2(i2)
)α
(µ2(i1) + µ2(i2)) <
(
µ1(i1)
µ2(i1)
)α
µ2(i1) +
(
µ1(i2)
µ2(i2)
)α
µ2(i2).
Therefore, for any γ : k + 1→ k, we have
k∑
j=1
(∑
γ(i)=j µ1(i)∑
γ(i)=j µ2(i)
)α
(
∑
γ(i)=jµ2(i)) <
k+1∑
i=1
(
µ1(i)
µ2(i)
)α
µ2(i).
Since the set of functions γ : k + 1 → k is finite, we conclude maxγ : k+1→k Γα(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) <
Γα(µ1||µ2).
Theorem 24 (∞-generatedness of Rényi divergence in the general case). For any α > 1, the α-
Rényi divergence is∞-generated: for any µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X), we obtain
DαX(µ1, µ2) = sup
γ : X→Prob(N)
DαX(f
♯(µ1), f
♯(µ2)).
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Proof.
DαX(µ1, µ2)
{Continuity ofDα [22, Theorem 16] }
= sup
k∈N
sup
g : X→k
DαX(g(µ1), g(µ2))
{Any g : X → k can be decomposed into a composition of g1 : X → N and g2 : N → k and vice versa. }
= sup
g1 : X→N
sup
g2 : N→k
DαX(g2(g1(µ1)), g2(g1(µ2)))
{Post-processing inequality ofDα}
≤ sup
g1 : X→N
DαX(g1(µ1), g1(µ2))
{There is γ : X → Prob(N) such that g1(µi) = γ
♯(µi) (i = 1, 2) for any g1 : X → N.}
≤ sup
γ : X→Prob(N)
DαX(γ
♯(µ1), γ
♯(µ2))
{Post-processing inequality ofDα}
≤ DαX(µ1, µ2)
This implies the∞-generatedness ofDα.
D zCDP and tCDP
We can define a family {∆zCDP (ξ)}ξ≥0 of divergences for (ξ, ρ)-zCDP and a one {∆tCDP (w)}w>1
for (w, ρ)-tCDP as follows ( negative values are allowed for zCDP):
∆
zCDP (ξ)
X (µ1||µ2) = sup
α>1
1
α
(DαX(µ1||µ2)− ξ).
∆
tCDP (w)
X (µ1||µ2) = sup
w>α>1
1
α
(DαX(µ1||µ2)).
We can easily see that there are values for the privacy parameters where the divergence∆zCDP (ξ)
is not 2-generated.
Consider the following distributions again,
µ1 =
1
3
d0 +
1
3
d1 +
1
3
d2, µ2 =
p2
p2 + p+ 1
d0 +
p
p2 + p+ 1
d1 +
1
p2 + p+ 1
d2
Then we have
1
α
(Dα3 (µ1||µ2)− ξ)
=
1
α
(
1
α− 1
log
(
1
3α
(
1
(p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1)1−α
(p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1))
)
− ξ
)
and
sup
γ : {0,1,2}→Prob({0,1})
1
α
(Dα2 (γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2))− ξ)
=
1
α

 1
α− 1
log

 1
3α

 1
(p2 + p+ 1)1−α
max


2α(p+ p2)1−α + 1,
2α(1 + p2)1−α + p1−α,
2α(1 + p)1−α + p2(1−α)





− ξ


=
1
α
(
1
α− 1
log
(
1
3α
(
1
(p2 + p+ 1)1−α
(2α(1 + p)1−α + p2(1−α))
))
− ξ
)
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We suppose p = 0.1 and ξ = 0. We then obtain
1
α
(Dα3 (µ1||µ2)− ξ)
=
1
α
(
1
α− 1
log
(
1
3α
(
1
1.111−α
(0.011−α + 0.11−α + 1))
))
sup
γ : {0,1,2}→Prob({0,1})
1
α
(Dα2 (γ
♯(µ1)||γ
♯(µ2))− ξ)
=
1
α
(
1
α− 1
log
(
1
3α
(
1
1.111−α
(2α1.101−α + 0.011−α)
)))
= −
log 3
α− 1
+
log 111
α
+
log(( 2111 )
α · 111 + 1)
α(α− 1)
We easily calculate 11.4 (D
1.4
3 (µ1||µ2)) = 1.4076..., and hence we then obtain∆
zCDP (0)
X (µ1||µ2) >
1.4. The remaining to show is the inequality for every α > 1:
−
log 3
α− 1
+
log 111
α
+
log(( 2111 )
α · 111 + 1)
α(α− 1)
< 1.4.
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